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Legal History-Unhappy Hybrid
by WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, Professor of Legal History, Marshall-Wythe School
of Law, College of William and Mary
The title which I have given to this
paper applies actually to the second of
the three parts in which I propose to
discuss the subject. In the first part,
I should like to review for you some
of the significant elements of legal his-
tory which have accounted for the
growing scholarly interest in it in re-
cent years. Then, in the second part
-at the risk of stepping on some toes
-I feel it necessary to point out some
of the professional conflicts and am-
bitions which have impeded progress
in the study of this fascinating sub-
ject. After that, I shall try to con-
clude on a positive note with some
suggestions for facilitating research in
legal history.
I
We are meeting, as you are well
aware, in the area which was literally
the birthplace of some of the funda-
mental legal institutions on which the
American way of life has been built.
Six miles from us, at Jamestown, was
the first permanent settlement in
America to be established within the
framework of English legal and po-
litical concepts. There, in 1619, con-
vened the first representative legisla-
tive assembly in the New World-an
assembly which for all practical pur-
poses has continued to the present. In
Williamsburg itself, in the eighteenth
century, came that flowering of po-
litical genius which then bore fruit
in many constitutional propositions
which made out the case for independ-
ence and provided the framework for
a new republic. Finally, on December
4, 1779 at the College of William and
Mary, the first chair of law and "po-
lice" (i.e., government or public af-
fairs) was created.
I do not recite these facts merely
from a sense of pride. On the con-
trary, may I add this observation:
Since the restoration of Colonial Wil-
liamsburg in the second quarter of
this century-and with an attendant
revival throughout the scholarly world
of articulate advocacy of Virginia's
contribution to our history-there has
been some danger that we may appear
to be trying merely to outshout the
claims of our sister colonies. On the
other hand, this fact is now generally
conceded: In the nineteenth century
while the South was caught in a cul-
tural lag aggravated first by the In-
dustrial Revolution and then by the
Civil War and Reconstruction, Amer-
ican historiography was beginning to
acquire some of the features of a ma-
ture discipline-and it was acquiring
these with an almost exclusively New
England orientation. As a conse-
quence, until the growth of substan-
tial historical research in the South
in the past generation, there has been
a vast void between 1492 and 1621 in
the average American's idea of his
own history.
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But in the development of twen-
tieth-century research which has
sought to establish a balance of his-
torical fact, there has been a tendency
for the pendulum to swing to the
opposite extreme. Thus, when the
Chief Justice of the United States sev-
eral years ago used rather loose rhet-
oric to picture the Mayflower bring-
ing the common law to the New
World, a chain reaction began in Vir-
ginia which ended with the fixing of
a tablet to the wall of the old James-
town church asserting that the com-
mon law came here first. An older,
and perhaps better known, debate has
been carried on (and still continues)
concerning the claims of William and
Mary in Virginia and the Litchfield
School in Connecticut to be America's
first in the professional study of law.
These are all, really, beside the
point. It is a matter of documentary
evidence, for example, that William
and Mary's chair of law was created
by the Board of Visitors on December
4, 1779, while the Litchfield School
under Tapping Reeve generally dates
its distinguished career from 1784.
But these dates are really significant
only in demonstrating that, if neither
William and Mary nor Litchfield had
done anything about legal education,
some other agency would have, at
about that time. The real grist for the
legal history mill is, rather: What was
the nature of academic preparation
for the bar in the beginning of the
new nation-at both of these schools?
What had been the nature of prepara-
tion for the practice of law in the pre-
Revolutionary period-what was the
degree of influence of the study by
colonials at the Inns of Court upon
colonial jurisprudence-what were
the political and social circumstances
under which legal institutions in the
United States were made independent
of England?
With these representative ques-
tions, some of the most obvious op-
portunities for research in legal his-
tory may be identified. How vast and
unworked the field really is may be
dramatized by this passage from the
excellent Studies in the History of
American Law, by Professor Richard
Morris of Columbia University:
The investigator of early American
law . . . has to plot his own course vir-
tually unaided. No general treatise deals
at any length with the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries of American law.
The absence of abridgements of the re-
ported cases makes the principal source
material more inaccessible than the Year
Books. The law reports contain material
as rich in significance for early American
law as are the publications of the Selden
Society for English legal history, and suf-
ficient reasons exist for publishing at
least important selections from this abun-
dant material on a scale commensurate
with the notable work of the society of
English scholars.1
To this statement of Professor Morris,
one might add the observation that
with the publication of such work as
is being done in this area, the need
and demand for much more of the
same becomes more evident. Thus the
volumes in the American Legal Rec-
ords series published by the Littleton-
Griswold Fund of the American His-
torical Society only tantalize the
scholarly appetite-there is so very
much more at hand to be explored
and made available. Here in Virginia,
I Morris, Studies in the History of Amer-
ican Law (Philadelphia, 2d ed. 1958), 259.
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the gigantic project known as the
Colonial Records Survey is bringing
to us from England and the Continent
a treasure-trove of documentary mate-
rials on every conceivable facet of
social, economic, political-and legal
-history, at which the scholar stares
with the ravening attitude of a starv-
ing man in sight of a banquet.
To demonstrate further the propo-
sition that, the better the work which
is done in this subject, the more in-
sistent the need for further work:
some months ago Professor George
Haskins of the University of Pennsyl-
vania published his superlative study
entitled, Law and Authority in Early
Massachusetts, covering the period
from 1630 to 1650 in what we all hope
is the first of several other works by
the author. But immediately it be-
comes more evident that we are long,
long overdue for a study which will
cover the same fundamental problems
as applied to the colony at Jamestown.
This is not by any means a demand
for a proliferation of work in one
strictly circumscribed segment of co-
lonial legal history, but rather an em-
phasizing of the fact that, in the ex-
ploration of the legal beginnings of
society in these two particular col-
onies, with such distinct social and
economic influences at work upon
them, we shall have laid an excellent
foundation for the more general study
of legal history throughout the entire
colonial period.
Take as another example the con-
tinuing interest in the constitutional
propositions set out in The Federalist
papers-an interest which has resulted
in three independent projects in the
past eighteen months: Our first full-
scale monographic study of the essays
by Professor Gottfried Dietze of the
Johns Hopkins University; an excel-
lent annotated edition of The Feder-
alist by Dr. Jacob Cooke of Colum-
bia; and another edition with intro-
ductory commentary by Professor
Benjamin F. Wright of the University
of Texas. Yet the activity in this area of
constitutional history suggests at least
three correlative studies which de-
mand attention before the extended
work on The Federalist may be said
to have made its most complete con-
tribution. There is, first of all, the
rather obvious need to delineate the
anti-Federalist position-which, far
from being rejected by implication
with the ratification of the Constitu-
tion, almost immediately found vin-
dication in the ratification of the Bill
of Rights. Secondly, in spite of all the
substantial work which has been done
on the essays by Hamilton, Jay and
Madison, we have yet to analyze their
papers in terms of American constitu-
tional theory and practice. Finally,
and most importantly of all, there is
the need for a truly exhaustive study
of the origins of constitutionalism in
the American colonies, in the states
during the Revolution, and in the
growing state structure in the years
after 1787.
There are other important projects
in active operation in the field of legal
history, which are providing invalu-
able documentary facilities for future
research. Among these may be men-
tioned the Documentary History of
the Ratification of the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights, sponsored by
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the National Historical Publications
Commission and going forward under
the editorship of Dr. Robert E. Cush-
man, the distinguished constitutional
authority who was so long identified
with Cornell University.
Then there is the multi-volume his-
tory of the Supreme Court of the
United States, being financed by the
Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise of the
Library of Congress and being edited
by a team of scholars under the gen-
eral direction of Professor Paul Freund
of Harvard University. If this is truly
a history of the court itself-rather
than a specialized discussion of con-
stitutional law as Charles Warren's
pioneer work on this subject proved
to be-it will be an extremely valu-
able addition to the bookshelf of
legal history.
Perhaps most important of all as a
stimulus to scholarship in this field
are the growing number of projects
on the collected papers of a number
of important public men. The model
for all such work, of course, is the
Papers of Thomas Jefferson under the
editorship of Dr. Julian P. Boyd of
Princeton University. Among similar
projects now under way, which have
a special meaning for the legal his-
torian, are the James Madison papers,
jointly sponsored by the University of
Virginia and the University of Chi-
cago; the Adams family papers spon-
sored by the Massachusetts Historical
Society; the papers of Alexander
Hamilton and of John Jay, both be-
ing edited at Columbia University;
the papers of Henry Clay at the Uni-
versity of Kentucky; and the papers
of John Calhoun at South Carolina.
In something of an aside, I might
observe that it is particularly fitting
when the papers of such significant
figures are edited under the sponsor-
ship of the college or university with
which they were identified. Thus,
Dartmouth College, which owes some-
thing to Daniel Webster, is under-
taking the project involving the pa-
pers of that statesman. Similarly, we
have been working at William and
Mary for several years to clear the
way for a project on the papers of
John Marshall-one of the chief na-
tional figures on the list which the
National Historical Publications Com-
mission urges be considered for com-
prehensive editorial treatment. I shall
refer to the Marshall project in more
detail when I come to the second part
of this paper.
There are, of course, innumerable
regional studies demanding early at-
tention in the broad field of legal his-
tory. Professor W. W. Blume of the
University of Michigan a number of
years ago demonstrated the important
source materials to be searched out,
and the significant facts to be gath-
ered therefrom, in reference to the
evolution of territorial law on the
frontier. It is a reproach to legal
scholarship that his pioneering lead
has not been followed. How much we
still need to know about the develop-
ment of the civil law system in Loui-
siana, and the processes of its transi-
tion under the influence of the
Americanized form of the common
lawl How much is to be found out
concerning the Spanish legal influence
in the American Southwest, about the
heterogeneous influences upon Cali-
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fornia legal institutions, about min-
eral law as it has affected the whole
law of real property in the Western
states
But there is more-far more-to
stimulate the scholar confronting this
subject. Professor Willard Hurst of
the University of Wisconsin, one of
the most dynamic and original think-
ers on legal history, recently pointed
out four major needs for large scale
research, which may be paraphased
as follows:
1. The significant developments in the
evolution of our law reflected in the
legislative, executive and administrative
processes-particularly in the twentieth
century. Correlatively, the contributions
of the organized bar to the legal evolu-
tion, and the social effect of laymen's at-
titudes toward law and law enforcement.
2. The general study of the interplay of
legal and economic trends.
3. The broad effects upon law of ele-
mental social forces in American life dur-
ing its periods of major adjustment,
e.g., in the Jacksonian period, during
and after the Civil War, and in the
Great Depression of the 1930's.
4. Correlative with the last two-and
to use Professor Hurst's own felicitous
phraseology-"legal history should treat
as critical themes the impact of social
inertia and social drift." The impact of
empirical-or worse, irrational-legisla-
tion upon significant social problems
created some remarkable legal proposi-
tions with which teacher, practitioner
and jurist have had to deal.2
The foregoing examples will suffice
to demonstrate that the fields are in-
deed white for the harvest, but the
workers are few. The signs of growing
activity in legal history should be a
matter of encouragement, although
for some, like the English scholar A.
K. R. Kiralfy, there is now more than
ever ground for despair. He says:
2 Hurst, The Law in United States His-
tory, 104 Proceedings of the American Philo-
sophical Society, 523-4 (1960).
At the present day, more and more new
subjects are establishing their claims to
study, while at the same time the dis-
parate and disjointed rules of modern
statute law require little background in
basic traditional principles . . . . Ulti-
mately the law of today will take its
place as the stuff of legal history, just
as the broader analysis of its rules will
form the subject-matter of jurisprudence.
By that time, however, there will be few
legal historians to deal with it.3
May I suggest that the objectives
listed as priorities by Professor Hurst
sufficiently dispose of the dilemma
suggested in the latter part of Pro-
fessor Kiralfy's statement. Multiplicity
of contemporary legal subjects is un-
questionably a problem of today's law
school, but it must not be allowed to
prolong the frustration with which
the study of legal history has long
been met in the law school. As for
legislation, it has already proliferated
to a degree that requires its study
now as the stuff of legal history. The
effects of the executive and admin-
istrative processes have been manifest
for a much longer period than even
the lawyer seems to realize. In short,
legal history is not an excursion in
antiquarianism by any means-refer,
for example, to the extremely stimu-
lating new book by Professor Karl N.
Llewellyn of the University of Chi-
cago, on The Common Law Tradi-
tion: Deciding Appeals. The legal his-
torian, like the general historian, has
something of incalculable practical
value to tell the whole of the legal
profession, if it will but give him the
opportunity to gather and study his
material.
A few of the problems which stand




in the way of legal history will be dis-
cussed in the second section of this
paper.
II
There are apparently three major
frustrations which bedevil the pursuit
of legal history. These are discussed
in more detail below, but may be sum-
marized here as follows:
1. Administrative apathy, either at
the top institutional level, or at the
law school level, or both.
2. Professional jealousies, particu-
larly virulent between the lawyers
and the historians, but only slightly
less pronounced between these two
groups and the political scientists.
3. Confusion of concepts as to the
definition, objectives and functions
of legal history.
Turning to the first of these prob-
lems-administrative apathy-it will
be discerned in two forms. There are
the cases where the subject is ignored
altogether; it has never been offered,
or has died of neglect, or has been
dropped in favor of some new spe-
cialty. This form of the problem prob-
ably can be dealt with only when the
second form has been resolved. In
the second form, the course is offered,
but no supporting program of re-
search in this area has been developed
or is in prospect. The course is simply
an elective-and an elective in that
category of optional courses which is
only taken in the last desperate effort
to fill out the required number of
hours.
Now-this is the real crux of the
problem. There are enough scholars
offering a legal history course that we
can properly focus upon the need for
supporting research rather than start-
ing with a missionary effort to get the
subject recognized. A cursory exam-
ination of law school catalogs indi-
cates that probably 25 per cent of
them list a course in legal history. But
it is another question when one seeks
to learn from the catalog (if one ever
learns anything from a catalog)
whether a specialist in the subject has
been developed on the faculty,
whether the course is complemented
with an appropriate research pro-
gram, and whether-something which
should be of particular interest to this
meeting-a definite portion of the
law library acquisitions program is
earmarked for legal history materials,
primary as well as secondary.
In the third part of this paper, I
shall try to demonstrate how legal his-
tory is a subject which is particularly
apt for use in the small law school or
the regional law school as well as for
the major school offering an exhaus-
tive curriculum and research program.
But before reaching that point we
must recognize fully the problem here
under consideration; perhaps it can
best be stated by quoting-from a
leading law teacher who has been as-
sured that he will be anonymous-his
concept of the problem:
The missionary role I see for legal his-
torians is to campaign to introduce some
dimension of time into the thinking and
interests of their able young colleagues
working in corporations, taxation, trade
regulation and other staples of the cur-
riculum. We teach the law we teach in
our schools today in a shamefully shal-
low time perspective, and too little that
has been done in legal history concerns
the development of substantive public pol-
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icy, too much time has been fastened on
the inner housekeeping of the courts.
There is little in the output of legal his-
tory publication to enlist recruits to the
field; if most of the product is second or
third rate, it is not surprising that first-
rate men are not stirred to think that
they might find fulfillment themselves in
pursuing their interests in time dimen-
sion.
This sentiment has been rather strik-
ingly echoed by the independent ob-
servations of several other eminent
law teachers; the tenor of their ob-
servations is (1) that the problem of
legal history is an extension of or con-
sequence of the generally limited,
pragmatic concept of the teaching of
law subjects as a whole; and (2) that
legal history itself is handled by men
who do not really believe that "the
future may learn from the past", (co-
lonial Williamsburg's hopeful phrase)
or that Santayana was right in de-
claring that we must repeat history if
we ignore it.
As for the second of these problems
-and I am giving them in an ascend-
ing order of magnitude-it is serious
enough to have brought progress in
legal history virtually to a standstill.
Although the American Historical
Association has for a number of years
had a special program in legal history,
in which some lawyers and historians
have been able to work together, it
does not take much to disrupt the un-
easy truce between the professions.
In part this is due to a crystallized
status-consciousness which plagues
both groups. You perhaps remember
the ironic commentary on the 1960
convention of the American Historical
Association which appeared in the
New Yorker:
[A professional historian interviewed by
the reporter] proceeded to divide Amer-
ican historians into three groups. First,
there is the "in," or "white-haired," or
"shoe" group, which can be defined as
comprising the men who attend the
smokers given by such pubishers as the
Columbia University Press, the Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, Macmillan, and
Knopf, and who feel at home at them.
. . . This top group consists of possibly
two hundred men .... The second group,
which embraces the overwhelming ma-jority of American historians, consists of
excellent teachers who for some reasonjust aren't eligible for the 'in' group.
Maybe they didn't attend the right uni-
versities, or maybe they lacked the proper
sponsorship, or maybe they haven't pub-
lished enough. The third group is made
up of historians who have acquired rank
by the simple attrition of their col-
leagues, of people who staff teachers' col-
leges, and of men who have trouble get-
ting and keeping jobs .... At annual
meetings of the A. H. A., members of the
"in" group give most of the speeches,
while the "out" groups sit and listen.
Members of the "in" group who don't
happen to be giving speeches rarely
bother to listen to their colleagues; they
prefer to stand around and talk and
carry on their secret bargaining. . . A
If this sounds familiar, it is perhaps
because it could almost as well be a
description of the annual conventions
of the Association of American Law
Schools. At both meetings, there is
the characteristic group of young fac-
ulty members described by the New
Yorker as either vainly trying to get
the attention of a prospective em-
ployer-and here it may be said cate-
gorically that no one can equal a law
school dean in the art of what I term
the unenthusiastic handshake-or as
being convoyed by some former fac-
ulty adviser who makes the strategic
introductions for him.
Related to this is the problem of a
mystery cult which has been devel-
oped around both disciplines-i.e.,
4 New Yorker, January 14, 1961.
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only the elect (as defined by those al-
ready "in") are qualified to deal with
the specialized subject matter upon
which legal history depends. Professor
Haskins, in the introduction to his
book mentioned earlier, describes the
problem thus:
Unfortunately, the domain of the law
is terrain upon which the historian with-
out formal legal education has been re-
luctant to intrude. One reason for this
reluctance has been the traditional isola-
tion of the law from other disciplines as
a result of the professionalization of legal
study in this country. Moreover, the com-
plexities of legal doctrine and the in-
tricacies of legal procedure have under-
standably tended to deter those without
professional legal training from inves-
tigating the sources and operation of law
even in a past civilization. Yet, because
law is a social product, reflecting not
only social organization but the incidence
of political and economic pressures, the
discovery of its past particularly requires
the techniques and insights of the social
scientist. Unhappily, as Professor Mark
Howe has said, "lawyers consider the his-
torians incompetent and irresponsible,
and the historians consider the lawyers
unimaginative and narrow." If the his-
tory of American law is to be written,
this mutual distrust must be dispelled,
and the outlooks of both disciplines com-
bined.5
There the matter stands at the mo-
ment. One or both of two procedures
obviously need to be followed: (1)
We may encourage the training of a
very small group of specialists in both
disciplines-e.g., a law school grad-
uate with advanced work in history
and related social sciences. This, how-
ever, breeds its own problem-the
scholar who is not accepted by either
group because he is tainted with the
characteristic of the opposition. From
this comes the description of legal his-
tory which is the title of this paper.
G Haskins, Law and Authority in Early
Massachusetts (New York, 1959), ix.
(2) Alternatively, we may seek a col-
laboration of a lawyer and a profes-
sional historian. Unfortunately, this
has some fundamental ideological as
well as practical disadvantages; and
to date, at least, there has been no
conspicuous example of a lion and a
lamb in these areas lying down to-
gether.
A moment ago I mentioned the in-
terest of the College of William and
Mary in undertaking a comprehen-
sive editorial project on the papers of
Chief Justice John Marshall. Some of
our experiences in clearing the way
for such a project illustrate the fun-
damental clashes of interest which
develop. First of all there is the ques-
tion, is such a project primarily with-
in the area of legal history with the
emphasis on the term "legal"--or is
the project essentially historical with
only an incidental "legal" pertinence?
By what objective standards is such a
question to be settled? Let me dispose
of this last question by simply ad-
vising that, if there are objective
standards which could be applied,
they have not yet been resorted to.
Let me further add the off-the-record
comment of one individual who
sought to aid in the implementing of
the project; he declared that of all
the scholarly editorial projects under
way or in prospect, those I men-
tioned a while ago-the Marshall Pa-
pers-presented "the damnedest con-
fusion" in his experience.
Why this confusion? First of all,
note that Marshall is the only one of
the several public figures whose pa-
pers are currently being gathered,
who is primarily a legal figure. Ham-
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ilton comes closest to Marshall as be-
ing identified with the law; but Ham-
ilton, Jefferson, Clay and Calhoun are
essentially and properly described as
political leaders. John Jay may also
fall into the category with Marshall,
but his career is not so exclusively
bound up with the law. The point is,
that from the outset of a proposed
project on John Marshall, the natural
tendency is to consider the possibility
of support for the project from the
legal profession.
I shall not take you through all the
labyrinthine avenues which we had
to follow in the course of bringing the
Marshall idea at least to a position
where it could seriously be considered
by this institution. Suffice it to report
that the first serious setback to the
project developed when the American
bar through its national agency de-
clined to be identified with it. There
were several good and sufficient rea-
sons why the bar could not sponsor
the project at the time; but the real
damage was done by the bar's state-
ment that it was not interested in
legal history as such, but was com-
mitted to a research program essen-
tially ad hoc and pragmatic and con-
temporary.
Now, this illustrates precisely the
apathy toward legal history as a sig-
nificant element in professional legal
training and practice to which I re-
ferred a moment ago. Coming from
the practitioner rather than from the
law schools, it suggests a major reason
why the law schools generally have
the attitude that they do.
I submit that this is a tragic
development. The attitude of the
organized bar in disclaiming any pro-
fessional responsibility for the compre-
hensive study of a giant in the law, is
damning confirmation of the conten-
tion that the law is oblivious to its
own cultural heritage. On the other
hand, the "closed shop" attitude of
the professional historians hardly en-
courages the hope that collaboration
between specialists on both sides can
be attained in the near future.
Finally, as to the third-and per-
haps greatest-problem bedeviling
legal history at the present: The con-
fusion of concepts. I submit that this
problem is manifested in two inde-
pendent forms:
1. There is the running dispute
between the historians (in law) and
the comparativists (in law). I pre-
fer to describe this as the conflict
between the "horizontal" and the
"vertical" approach to the subject
-and I shall explain what I mean
by this in a moment.
2. Then there is the failure of re-
conciliation of two other viewpoints
of legal history: One of these I shall
term the view of legal history ge-
nerically; the other, the view of
legal history as the synoptic frame
of reference for a contemporary
subject.
Before dealing with these two
forms of the problem, let us illustrate
the problem as a whole by consider-
ing some of the definitions of legal
history by which the organized efforts
in the field are being influenced. In
establishing the American Journal of
Legal History several years ago, Pro-
Vol. 55
UNHAPPY HYBRID
Lessor Erwin Surrency of Temple Uni-
versity described it in these terms:
First, legal history is the study of the de-
velopment of legal doctrines through
statutes, court decisions, and the opin-
ions of any lawmaking body considered
in relation to social, political and eco-
nomic history.
Second, legal history embraces the his-
tory and development of people and in-
stitutions such as courts, legislatures, law
enforcement agencies, etc.
Third, legal history should embrace the
evaluation of the contribution of judges
to the development of law. Included in
this would be biographical material, on
the lives of judges and lawyers empha-
sizing their professional accomplishments.
Fourth, legal history needs bibliograph-
ical information as to articles and books
on its subjects.
This is obviously a basic definition.
It suggests certain fairly orthodox
avenues of approach to a subject
which obviously has been so com-
pletely unexplored that a number of
other avenues need also to be devel-
oped. While it does not necessarily
suggest a conflict of ideas, I should
like to have your indulgence while I
quote somewhat at length from a pa-
per by Professor Hurst, to which I
have already referred; I recommend
it in its entirety to you, as it appears
in the October 17, 1960 issue of the
Proceedings of the American Philo-
sophical Society.
Four limitations of the general product
attest the want of philosophy in the
study of North American legal history.
(1) Historians have exaggerated the work
of courts and legal activity immediately
related to litigation. (2) They have paid
too little attention to the social func-
tions of law. (3) They have not dis-
tributed their effort with adequate re-
sponse to the facts of timing and the
reality of major discontinuities in the
country's growth in relation to the uses
of law. (4) They have exaggerated areas
of conscious conflict and deliberated ac-
tion, at the expense of realistic account
of the weight of social inertia and the
momentum of social drift.
Most of the business of the bar through
the nineteenth century had to do with
the property and contract affairs of cli-
ents, and most of the law of these fields
was common (that is, judge-made) law,
so that through the formative period of
our main legal tradition the focus re-
mained on the judicial process. * * *
This bias of professional thinking was
not affected by the fact that through the
nineteenth century Congress and the state
legislatures churned out large quantities
of important legislation, or by the fact
that in great areas of policy which did
not lend themselves easily to common law
development the framework of the law
was erected mainly in statutes (as in the
law of the public lands, public educa-
tion, public utilities, highways, health
and sanitation, or the organizaton of
local government). From limited begin-
nings in the late nineteenth century,
executive and administrative law-making
grew to great proportions alongside the
statute law. Judicial law-making was
never as exclusively important as the con-
centration of legal writing might seem
to show. From the 1870's on, legislative,
executive, and administrative processes
definitely became the principal sources
of formed policy. The course offerings
of even the better law schools were slow
to reflect this reality. But legal research
was even slower, with legal historians
badly lagging the field.
The bulk of legal history writing has
been about topics defined by legal cate-
gories. We have much writing about com-
merce clause doctrine, but little about the
meaning of commerce clause doctrine
for the development of operation of sec-
tional or nationwide marketing organ-
ization or about the impress which such
business history may have made on con-
stitutional principles. There is some
rather formal history of property law,
but little history of the significance of
fee simple title for types of land use, for
the private and social accounting of in-
come and costs of alternative land uses,
or for the political and social balance
of power. There are some essays on the
history of contract law, but little or no
effort to define or appraise the meaning
that contract law had for the function-
ing of the market, the provision of credit,
or the allocation of gains and costs of
business venture. There are scattered
writings about the history of the mort-
gage, the corporate indenture, the receiv-
ership and tax law, but we lack the good
studies we should have of the historic
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relations of law to the growth and chan-
neling of investment capital. There is a
good deal in print about various aspects
of the Bill of Rights, but no connected
story of the implications of civil rights
doctrines for the shifting balance of
power among various kinds of groups
and between the individual and official
and private group power at different
stages of the country's growth. Though
better than a generation has gone by
since we heard the call for a sociological
jurisprudence, legal history writing has
made little response, but continues con-
tent on the whole to let the formal head-
ings of the law fix its subject matter.
0 * * * *
In the total distribution of effort, there
has been a disproportionate attention in
legal history writing to beginnings-and
to beginnings in their most obvious
sense-at the expense of proper develop-
ment of hypotheses concerning the main
lines of growth through to our own time.
Much attention has focused on colonial
origins, on the period of constitutional
experiment from 1776 to 1790, and on
the successive frontier phases of national
expansion. I do not quarrel with the
worth of attending to such formative
periods taken in themselves, but only
with the tendency to fasten onto origins
without equal curiosity to follow through,
and with failure to see that in terms of
law's relation to gathering issues of power
and social function there were other less
obvious periods of beginnings which
should also be studied. First, as an ex-
ample of the want of follow through, it
is odd that for so many states we have
writing which with care sometimes verg-
ing on antiquarian enthusiasm traces the
beginnings of territorial and state courts
(once again, the excessive preoccupation
with judicial process), but little good
writing on such basic themes as law's
relation to the creation of transportation
networks, the law's response to the busi-
ness cycle, or the relation of tax policy to
the fortunes of agriculture and other
extractive industries.
0 * * * *
Second, on the neglect of the less ob-
vious beginnings, the most notable ex-
amples are the relative inattention to the
sharp changes in direction and pace of
social movement which came about in
the 1830's, the 1870's, and the 1930's.6
Now as to the two major forms of
the problem of definition of legal his-
6 loc. cit. n. 2, supra, at 521 et seq.
tory, suggested by the foregoing quo-
tations and by the two forms of the
problem I mentioned before that.
First, as to the confusion between
the "vertical" school, as I have called
it, and the "horizontal" school or
comparative lawyers. By "vertical" I
mean a chronological historical ap-
proach-from the origins of a legal
proposition or institution to its ul-
timate effects. An example would be
any given rule of contract or prop-
erty law traced back to the earliest
records and forward to its current ap-
plication. The comparative approach,
of course, is essentially contemporary
-the study of the same rule, let us
say, under different modern jurisdic-
tions. Ideally, of course, but probably
only theoretically, there should be a
"vertical" approach which is also
"horizontal" at every chronological
level. Until that nimble bit of research
can be accomplished, however, we
shall simply have to concede an equal
degree of validity to both schools.
This does not really solve the prob-
lem, of course-it simply evades an
answer.
The other form of the problem-
that which I have called the generic
vs. the synoptic view-brings us back
again to the characteristically prag-
matic and usually short-sighted atti-
tude of many practitioners and all too
many law schools. This is the attitude
that legal history derives its primary
validity as the documentary back-
ground to a current problem of law;
that legal history is the legal history
of something, some element in a sub-
ject in litigation. From there it is but
a step to the assumption that all legal
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history is either of practical use in an
ad hoc situation, or is insufferably
pedantic. This is what I call the syn-
optic view; I am not sure that the
dictionary agrees with this definition
of "synoptic"-but so much the worse
for the dictionary, this may be offered
as an original contribution to knowl-
edge.
The generic view of legal history, I
submit, while it does not solve the
problem of the vertical and horizontal
schools I have described since it ap-
plies to either of them, rather deals
with legal history as legal history
rather than as the legal history of
something. In case we lost each other
on that last sentence, this view of
legal history accommodates the proj-
ect which deals with isolated partic-
ulars as well as with synthesizing
studies. It is sympathetic to the ap-
proach which deals exhaustively with
the subject within the definition set
by the researcher. It is ultimately
pragmatic, but not in the sense of the
synoptic idea I described above. But
until it gains ascendancy, the pursuit
of legal history will continue to breed
unhappy hybrids
III
Having briefly reviewed some of the
opportunities, and rather tortuously
reviewed some of the problems, let me
now quickly conclude this paper with
my few suggestions for advancing the
cause of legal history. It goes without
saying, I trust, that the necessary pre-
requisite for any advance is a dem-
onstrated willingness of law schools
and their affiliated institutions to en-
courage the work of the specialist in
this field, to provide him with re-
search opportunities and to include
his primary source materials among
the basic collections of the library.
The first practical opportunity
which seems apparent is for the devel-
opment of first-rate regional studies.
This is what I had in mind when I
suggested a few moments ago that the
small law school and the regional law
school might well develop legal his-
tory as an important element in its
curriculum. With such an enormous
range of subjects to be investigated,
there can hardly be conceived to be
any law school which does not have
rather abundant source material at
hand for a study in depth of some
specific topic in legal history. The
local application of a given rule of
law-and, more significantly, the lo-
cal factors which gave the peculiar
local coloring to the rule-is an ob-
vious type of project within the def-
inition of regional studies.
Secondly, there are studies auxil-
iary to the specialties of a given law
school. For example, since an advance
program in law and taxation is of-
fered at William and Mary, it is rather
obvious that a number of subjects in
the history of law and economics in
taxation policy and context would be
in order. Here, again, regional studies
are in order, although the specialty
itself may be confined to the larger
law schools.
In the more distant future is a third
possibility, of coordinated projects
(there are sad connotations to the
word "cooperative") -e.g., the study
of the same subject by different schol-
ars under different jurisdictions. This
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awaits the day when legal history has
become sufficiently developed as a
discipline to stimulate a uniform or
centralized national program. That
day, it must be admitted, is some dis-
tance in the future-indeed, the
burning question before the legal
profession at the moment is whether
the time has yet arrived for collective
efforts through national organization.
Both the promising Journal inaugu-
rated by Temple University and the
Society organized to bring together
those interested in legal history, are
groping for a definition of their
proper functions. The fact that an
early legal history society died almost
a-borning is less an indication of lack
of interest in legal history than evi-
dence of the lack of adequate stand-
ards of achievement, based upon
enough published research of high
significance, to persuade the best
minds in this subject that something
more can be accomplished in concert.
The quality of the work of the Sel-
den Society in England, and of in-
dividual English scholars like Mait-
land and Holdsworth and Plucknett,
indicates the level at which American
research must operate. But this does
not necessarily mean that legal his-
tory research on this side of the At-
lantic must restrict itself to the early
documentary materials and their in-
terpretation, which has been the high
achievement of the Selden Society.
Rather, the opportunity for American
legal history-and the responsibility
-is considerably greater: As Morris
of Columbia has said, we urgently
need to uncover our original source
materials-but as Hurst of Wisconsin
points out, we need equally urgently
to devote our attention to the historic
development of the law in its com-
plete social, economic and political
context. American legal history has
twice as challenging a task, as a result.
It should be evident from what has
been said in this paper that the bibli-
ographic problems of promoting re-
search in legal history are among the
most demanding in the law library
field. More than for any other subject
in law, legal history requires for its
proper pursuit access to the whole
field of social science material as well
as basic documents in law itself. It is
said that when one of our leading au-
thorities in legislation was asked, a
few years ago, to draft an exhaustive
bibliography on the subject of con-
temporary state constitutional prob-
lems, he responded with more than
25,000 references.
Legal history can only be studied
with ready access to the source mate-
rials of the general historian, the com-
plete range of government publica-
tions, the personal papers and works
of leading individuals of the period
under study, plus a sympathy from
the researcher's institution which
guarantees time to work in these rich
materials. When that day arrives, legal
history will change from an unhappy
hybrid to a hardy independent branch
of legal learning.
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